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STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE:
A BAD IDEA GETTING WORSE
George W. Dent, Jr. t
INTRODUCTION

Like Dracula, stakeholder participation in corporate governance is
an ogre that has been repeatedly slain by prudent argument but
invariably springs back to life. This ogre persists because capitalism
does not create anyone's idea ofheaven. Inevitably, some who cannot
or will not accept reality float well-intended but misguided schemes
intended to usher us into utopia. We are now suffering a renewed
outbreak of these fantasies. Now, however, they are ill-advised not
only for the reasons given in the past-although those reasons remain
valid-but also because the globalization of capital markets has
seriously exacerbated the costs of flaws in the law of corporate
governance. This Article will review the traditional objections to
stakeholder governance-with special attention to the proposals of
the other participants on this panel, Professors Kent Greenfield and
Timothy Glynn-and also discuss current trends that should influence
our thinking on this topic.

I.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STAKEHOLDERS: WHERE ARE WE

Now?
A. The Current Welfare ofStakeholders

An initial problem is simply defming "stakeholders" or, as
Professor Greenfield calls them, "non-equity investors."1
'
2
"[S]takeholder theory can be many things to many people .... " As
t Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Business Organizations Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Michael Schmit and Judy Kaul for their
excellent research assistance.
I Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 2 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Reclaiming].
2 R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate Objective
Revisited," 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 365 (2004); see also Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory
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for non-executive employees, I support much that Professor
Greenfield and Professor Glynn say. In the last twenty-five years, too
much of our economic gains have gone to the wealthiest Americans;
income for most Americans has stagnated. 3 The resultant deepening
of economic inequality is disturbing.
Most of this trend stems from changes in technology, the
globalization of economic activity, unchecked immigration, American
tax policies, and changing social mores· (like the divergence of class
attitudes toward marriage4 ) having nothing to do with corporate
governance. There is some connection, though. Compensation for
many CEOs has become obscenely excessive and economically
indefensible. 5 Even if that excess comes entirely from the hides of
investors, it breeds understandable resentment among employees.
Also, many companies have a CEO autocracy that is inefficient and
sometimes disastrous. Many workers have been devastated by the
collapse of companies like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. These
catastrophes also injure customers, suppliers, and the communities in
which the companies operate.
It follows that I also agree with Professor Glynn and Professor
Greenfield that employees and other stakeholders have an interest in
the success of their company even if they do not own stock in it.
Employees, creditors, and suppliers all benefit if a company grows
and prospers. In that sense they, like the shareholders, have a residual
interest in the firm. That is not to say, however, that the interests of
each group are identical; their interests differ significantly. 6 Their
interests should be considered in corporate governance-and indeed
they are. How could it be otherwise? No company can succeed
without attending to its employees, customers, suppliers, and the

of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of FVIzo and What Really
Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (1997) (finding twenty-seven different definitions of
"stakeholder").
3 See Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1043, 1048-49 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance].
4 There is a growing "family gap" between the children of well-to-do parents, who are
much more likely to live with both their biological parents (who are married to each other), and
children of the poor, who as a result of illegitimacy or divorce are more likely to live with only
one parent (usually the mother). Tbe former reap huge benefits by virtually every measure of
social welfare. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (2007); KAY S.
HYMOWITZ, MARRIAGE AND CASTE IN AMERICA: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL FAMILIES IN A
POST-MARITAL AGE (2006).
5
CEO compensation has continued to rise despite public outcry and the protracted slump
in stock prices. See Claudia H. Deutsch, A Brighter Spotlight, Yet the Pay Rises, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2008 (Bus. Section), at 1 (citing report of a compensation research firm based on SEC
filings in the first three months of2008).
6
See irifra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
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communities in which it operates. 7 But is the degree of consideration
now given optimal? That issue requires further discussion.
B. The Current State of Corporate Governance

Stakeholder theorists hurl two types of criticism against current
corporate governance practices. One is that it does not maximize
share prices. The other is that it does. In this part I will discuss the
charge that current practice dbes not maximize share value because
investors are fixated on short-term performance and that current
practice abuses employees, and the corollary claim that stakeholder
governance would "grow the pie"-i.e., actually increase share
values. I will then discuss whether maximizing share value is the
proper goal of corporate governance.
1. Short-termism

In economic theory, rational common stockholders seek
to maximize the net present value of the flrm, which (in
public companies) is gauged by its stock price. 8 Stakeholder
theorists sometimes deny this. Professor Greenfield believes that
"short-termism" is a serious problem for American corporations now,
and that this problem stems from shareholder primacy. 9 I believe
short-termism is not a serious problem and, to the extent that it is a
problem at all, it stems not from excessive shareholder power but
from excessive CEO power and shareholder weakness.
7 Finns that "contract with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation
. will have a competitive advantage." Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The
Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 353 (2004). "In the long run, shareholders
can't systematically exploit other 'stakeholders' in the corporate enterprise" because doing so
would damage the shareholders' own interests. BernardS. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 863 (1992); see also Bradley
Warren Benson & Wallace N. Davidson III, The Relation between Stakeholder Management,
Firm Value, and CEO Compensation: A Test of Enlightened Value Maximization (Working
Paper, Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstrat=l208403 (empirical study
concluding that "fmns cannot mismanage relations with their stakeholders if they wish to
maximize the value of the firm").
Thus it is misleading to say, as Professor Greenfield does, that I believe "we need to worry
only about the investment of one of the many investors, namely that of shareholders."
Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1043. Shareholders' desire to maximize
the value of the stock requires them to care about employees. However, I do not claim that
"employees need not worry because shareholders have their back." !d. at 1060. Pursuit of profit
places a floor on the treatment of employees, but their interests are not identical and market
forces alone may not produce an outcome that society does or should consider fair.
8 "The public's valuation of a company in the marketplace has unique value, because it is
the only judgment that cannot be manipulated, at least not for long." ROBERT A.G. MONKS &
NELL MlNOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 67 (3d ed. 2004).
9 "(P]art of the problem is the short-term focus of corporate management, which is a
function of market, norm, and law." Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1049.
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First, "for all the anecdotal evidence of short-termism and its
effects, there is not a lot of empirical data to back it up. " 10 "[N]o one
has demonstrated that the long/short phenomenon exists . . . . " 11
Undoubtedly some investors trade on the basis of short-term
performance, but this is no more important than that some investors
trade on the basis of astrology. All that is needed for markets to be
efficient is a critical mass of rational investors. "[C]ompetition among
investors who do not suffer from a short-term bias will drive stock
price toward an unbiased level." 12
If short-termism is common, its claimants should be able to
identify numerous profitable opportunities that go unfunded in
America, so that these opportunities are either taken abroad or are not
exploited at all. I am not aware that anyone has produced such a
bill of particulars. If anything, America seems quite receptive to
long-term, risky projects because of our vibrant venture capital
industry, an industry that barely exists even in many industrialized
countries.
Perhaps a few firms are obsessed with the short-term, but does that
stem from shareholder pressure? There is no evidence that
institutional investors dislike long-term investment in research and
development ("R&D"). 13 Share prices rise, not fall, when companies
increase R&D. 14 Stock markets generally ignore accounting changes
that alter reported earnings but not cash flow. 15 Many investors
(including many institutional investors) do trade rapidly, but there is
no evidence that this trading stems from obsession with short-term
results. 16 Strong shareholder rights are associated with higher share
and bond prices. 17
10 Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Termism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at Cl. "Baruch
Lev, the well-known accounting professor at New York University ... scoffs at the notion that
short-terrnism is even a problem." ld.
11 Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
10, 13 (1991).
12 Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 141' 148 (2005).
IJ See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER
OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 12-13 (!985) (finding that high institutional
ownership is not associated with lower research and development).
14 See J. Randall Woolridge, Competitive Decline and Corporate Restructuring: Is a
Myopic Stock Market to Blame?, I J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 26, 33-34 (1988). See generally John
J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and the Market
Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399,415 (1985).
15 See Robert S. Kaplan & Richard Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information:
Some Empirical Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 225, 245 (1972).
16 "If a governance provision does not serve long-term shareholder value, its adoption will
likely reduce short-term prices (which reflect expectations about long-term value) ...." Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HAR.v. L. REv. 1784, 1802 (2006);
see also Bernard Black & Reinier KraaknJan, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search
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If short-termism exists in some firms, it is more likely the product
of CEO domination-i.e., of too little shareholder power, not too
much. CEOs entrenched behind antitakeover defenses actually reduce
R&D. 18 Some executives pump up their finn's stock price (often to
push it above the exercise price of their stock options) with
misleading disclosures, then dump their stock before the truth gets
out. 19 Outside investors cannot do that. Other cognitive malfunctions
may prevent dominant managers from maximizing the value of the
finn even if they want to do so. 20 Thus, some dismiss CEOs' claims
that they manage for the long-term as "bogus."21 If some shareholders
unduly stress the short-term, perhaps it is because they have so little
control over the long-term.
2. Abuse ofStakeholders

In addition to the charge of short-termism, some stakeholder
theorists charge that current corporate governance practices
sometimes fail to maximize share value because they mistreat
stakeholders. They claim that firms make unenforceable promises to
induce stakeholders (primarily employees, although they could

for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 521,532 (2002) ("Under elementary principles offmance,
even short-term investors have an incentive to maximize the firm's long-term value .... "); Roe,
supra note 11, at 13 ("The long/short controversy posits a market failure. After all, institutions
should know how to discount long-term value to present value.").
17 See George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1213, 1261-63 (2008)
[hereinafter Dent, Academics in Wonderland].
18 See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERJCA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR
BUSINESS MYOPIA 108, 249-50 n.4 (1991) (citing a study by the SEC's Office of Economic
Analysis).
19 See generally ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. 1NDERGAARD, PUMP AND DUMP:
THE RANCID RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY (2005); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 703-04 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate
Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 6-8 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper
No. 274, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581. Managers also time corporate
disclosures to maximize their profits on stock options. See David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO
Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON.
73 (2000); Keith W. Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive
Stock Option Grants, 7 J. CoRP. FIN. 53 (2001); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option
Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards
and Company News Announcements, 52 1. FIN. 449 (1997).
20 See Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in
Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 194 (1977); James G. March & Zur Shapira,
Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987).
21 Nocera, supra note 10; see also MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET
SHORT-TERMISM 8 (2006) (reporting that "most business managers stated that they would rather
forgo an investment promising a positive return on capital than miss the quarterly earnings
expectations of their analysts and financiers").
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include independent contractors, customers, suppliers, and
communities where the firm operates) to make commitments (in the
case of employees, commitments of "human capital") to the firm. 22
The firm's promises are unenforceable because the understandings on
both sides are too vague or complex (e.g., "if you do a good job we
will treat you fairly") to be specified in an enforceable contract. Thus
the understandings are only "implicit" contracts. Shareholders, then,
may make "opportunistic attempts to increase 'shareholder value' by
changing the corporate rules in the middle of the game. " 23
This scenario is not impossible, but its occurrence is probably rare.
A company in trouble might lower the wages of or fire dedicated
employees, but do such steps violate implicit contracts? One problem
with implicit contracts is their terms are uncertain, and subject to
misunderstandings, precisely because they are not explicit. It is not
unreasonable to expect that the employees of a prosperous flrm will
share its success, while the employees of troubled companies may
share their suffering. 24 Thus, although stakeholder participation in
corporate governance might occasionally shelter employees from
abusive breaches of implicit contracts, it could also shelter them from
properly sharing the burdens of failing companies and impose other
unacceptable costs. 25 By contrast, -traditionally governed corporations
cannot treat employees less well than their market value demands or
the employees would quit and the company could not hire equally
valuable substitutes. Indeed, shareholders have no incentive not to
treat employees as well as possible so long as that treatment does not
impair share value. 26 Ifbecause of market failure labor markets do not
adequately protect, relief should come directly through changes in

22 See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses_· Some Empirical Evidence on Why
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 685-86
(2003); see also Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1043 (stating that one
problem of corporate governance is "how to induce investment from the various contributors to
the firm").
23 Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 805
(2007); see also Kent Greenfield, Proposition.- Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 948, 951 (2008) [hereinafter Greenfield, Saving the World] (alleging that
corporations "fail to sustain implicit or explicit commitments to communities").
24 If there are net social benefits to cushioning employees from such harm, the cost of
such cushioning should be borne socially-i.e., by the government-rather than by
shareholders. In general, however, it is better for society if resources are directed to growing
than to shrinking enterprises, so steps to insulate workers from such harm should generally be
limited.
15
For discussion of these costs, see infra notes 34-55 and accompanying text
26
See, e_g., D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57
EMORY L.J. 985, 1008 (2008) ("When boards of directors are able to enhance employee welfare,
make the environment cleaner, or improve human rights throughout the world without impairing
shareholder value, they often do it."); see also supra note 7.
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employment laws rather than through tinkering with corporate
governance.
3. Would Stakeholder Governance "Grow the Pie"?

Like many stakeholder theorists, Professor Greenfield believes that
stakeholder governance has the potential to "grow the pie."27 To
weigh this claim we should first review the economic rationale for
committing corporate control to shareholders to begin with.
"[S]hareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive
to maximize the value of the flfll1." 28 Stakeholder theorists reply that
stockholders are not the only residual claimants; stakeholders share in
the success or hardship of the flfll1. 29 This is true. 30 However, control
is still best allotted to shareholders because they are the primary
residual claimants, and they are only residual claimants. The claims of
other stakeholders are largely fixed and senior to those of the
shareholders. Stakeholders may reap additional benefits if the
company flourishes. Stockholders, however, have no fixed claims;
they get their share only from the residue.
As a result, stakeholders do not necessarily benefit from
maximizing the value of the flfll1. Employees may get raises if their
flfll1 prospers, but even if the flfll1 falters they must be paid their
agreed wage, even if that leaves nothing for shareholders. This is not
a fanciful scenario; many firms pay their workers and creditors and
perform their contractual duties to their customers but generate no
profits for their stockholders. Because they are just residual claimants,
only shareholders have "the perspective of the aggregate."31
2 7 See Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at I 044 ("[C)orporations
themselves will be better managed in the long term when management is held to consider the
interests of all key investors of the firm, not just a small subset of them."); see also Margaret M.
Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 885, 900 (2003) (claiming that the team-production model of corporate governance works
to maximize firm value).
28 Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1266, 1267-68 (1999); see also Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 7, at 353 ("Only residual cash
flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the fmn. "); Robert B.
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 149 (2009)
("Shareholders are the appropriate group to monitor the board and correct errors because they
are uniquely sensitive to the principal signal indicating a deviation of the board from its duty to
the corporation: the market price of the corporation's stock.").
29 See Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1044 ("[N]on-shareholder
stakeholders are investors, too .... ").
3o Thus it is not true that I "conflat[e] the term 'investor' with shareholder." Id. at 1051.
However, the other stakeholders' investments differ from the stockholders' in ways that
influence their attitudes toward corporate governance.
31 Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1977, at 3, 20-23. See also STEPHEN M. BAJNBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
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The control rights of stockholders can be compared to the property
rights of a homeowner. The value of a home depends in part on the
condition of its neighborhood, so a homeowner's neighbors are to
some extent residual claimants of the value of her house-they
benefit if she improves her property, and their own homes depreciate
if she lets her house deteriorate. Laws place some limits on the
owner's use of her property. She may not, for instance, create a
nuisance. Residents of a neighborhood may also agree by contract to
covenants that limit their property rights for their collective benefit.
With these exceptions, the owner may do as she pleases with her
property.
Likewise, shareholders should control the firm. Their control is
subject to some legal limitations (such as the law of torts) and to
contracts with stakeholders (such as employment contracts), but
within these limits they should be free to do as they think best.
Professor Greenfield nonetheless argues that stakeholder
governance can increase corporate efficiency. He suggests that
externalizing costs (in the vernacular, antisocial behavior) would be
less common under stakeholder governance. 32 This is dubious.
Stakeholder constituencies have no more motive than do shareholders
to heed any interests but their. own. Employees, for instance, have as
much incentive as do stockholders to pollute the environment or to
sell shoddy products to one-time purchasers.
Consider recent fiascos like Enron and Tyco. Employees of these
companies were better positioned than public stockholders to know
what was going on. They could have blown the whistle to law
enforcement agencies and alerted fellow employees to dump their
company's stock from their investment accounts. They did not do so.
Why, then, should we assume that employee representatives on the
board would have taken effective action? Employee participation in
corporate governance might actually increase managerial discretion. 33

AND ECONOMICS 469 (2002), which states: "[S]hareholders are the only corporate constituent
with a residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and earnings." Therefore,
"shareholders have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residual
claim." Id. at 470. Thus I do not just "assumeD that shareholders are best seen as owners of the
corporation." Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1050. Rather, economic
theory and empirical evidence indicate that efficiency is maximized when control of
corporations is allotted to shareholders.
32 See Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1055 (stating that
corporations can "profit by extracting economic rents from society by externalizing social
costs").
33 See Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 192 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) ("[T]he net beneficiaries [of employee participation in corporate
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Professor Greenfield says "employees are vitally interested in the
success of their employers."34 But why wouldn't employees prefer
that there be no payouts to shareholders, none, ever? Even if that
might eventually injure employees, the damage might not occur
for a long time, after most current employees are ·gone. For the
mayor's political appointee serving as a corporate director, the
relevant time-frame might be next month's election. In other words,
stakeholder governance might create a problem of short-termism,
which is now minor or non-existent. 3?
Apart from economic theory, there is another and perhaps more
telling problem with the stakeholder concept: If stakeholder
governance can produce a bigger pie, and a larger piece for each
constituency, why has it not happened through private arrangements?
Sometimes pie-increasing solutions cannot be reached privately
because the transaction costs of negotiation are too high. But at least
for employees with collective bargaining that should not be so-they
are negotiating with management already.
Professor Greenfield suggests that fmns do not act voluntarily
because they "simply do not see the potential long-term profitability
of stakeholder governance."36 This explanation is unpersuasive.
Businesses constantly seek new ways to increase profits. Stakeholder
theory has been around for a long time; it is not so novel an idea that
it simply has not occurred to investors and entrepreneurs. If it held
any promise, some firms would try it. But even if we assumed that he
is right about this, it would follow that after stakeholder governance
was forced on investors, they would discover they liked it. He should,
then, be willing to let shareholders of a company vote to end
stakeholder governance and institute shareholder primacy after some
period of time (one year?), since they would not do so unless
experience showed that stakeholder governance materially injured
them.
My students know that one of my favorite allusions is the story
Silver Blaze, in which Sherlock Holmes solves a crime in part by
noting the dog that did not bark. 37 The dog's silence showed that the
intruder was an insider; had it been an outsider, the dog would have

governance] are those who ought to be controlled: the company's management.").
3 4 Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1057.
35 See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
36 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note I, at 26.
37 When Holmes refers to "the curious incident of the dog in the night-time," Inspector
Gregory says, "The dog did nothing in the night-time." Holmes replies, "That was the curious
incident." Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 347
(Doubleday & Co. 1930) (1893).
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barked. It is interesting in this case to notice the dogs that are not
barking. Professor Greenfield touts his proposal as beneficial to
employees. If he were right, we should see groups of employees
forming finns and hiring capital.
Actually, we do see this, but not at all in the way stakeholder
advocates want. In fact, most companies are controlled by employees,
but only by a small, elite group of employees. Law firms are run by
their partners. Even in industrial, non-professional firms employee
control, where it exists, tends to be concentrated in a homogeneous
subset of workers, not shared among all. 38 The reason for this is that
the interests of different groups of employees conflict. 39 In general,
labor-controlled firms grow more slowly and create fewer new jobs
than other public firms. 40 When outside equity capital is needed,
venture capitalists provide it, but only on conditions that are not at all
what stakeholder theorists envision.
American organized labor has also shown little interest in board
representation. 41 And Europe is moving toward the shareholder model
and may have passed the United States in protecting investors. 42
In addition to this "negative" empirical evidence, there is positive
empirical evidence that employee participation in corporate
governance does not "grow the pie." In France and Norway, law
requires employee representation on certain boards. The conditions
and exceptions permit a good comparison of firms with and without
such representation. Recent studies in both countries found that
employee representation significantly injured finn performance. 43
Other studies have made similar findings in other countries,44 even
when labor representation is granted voluntarily. 45
See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 7, at 354.
40 See 01ubunmi Fa1eye et al., When Labor Has a Voice in C01porate Governance, 41 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 489 (2006).
41 The addition of Douglas Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers, to the board of
Chrysler in 1979 was a first for a union leader, but in the eyes of some in the union it "tainted"
Fraser. See ROBERT B. REICH & JOl-IN D. DONOHUE, NEW DEALS: THE CHRYSLER REVIVAL
AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 126, 226 (1985).
42 See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
43 R. Oystein Strom, Better Firm Peiformance with Employees on the Board? Not in the
Long Run (University College of Ostfold, Paper No. 1757, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=967445 (study of Norwegian experience); Edith Ginglinger et al.,
Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies 4 (Jan. 10,
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1259609 ("Directors elected by employees by right
[in France] significantly reduce payout ratios, increase overall staff costs, and increase board
size, complexity, and meeting frequency-but do not significantly inJpact firm value or
profitability.").
44 See Felix R. FitzRoy & Komelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 95
SCANDINAVlAN J. ECON. 365 (1993) (study in Germany); Frank A Schmid & Frank Seger,
Arbeitriehmermitbestimmung, Allokation von Entscheidungsrechten und Shareholder Value, 68
38

39
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Voluntary action may in fact be moving in the opposite direction.
Employee stock ownership plans ("ESOP") were originally adopted
mostly in nonunionized firms, but by the 1990s they became just as
prevalent in unionized fmns. 46 The adoption of an ESOP in a
unionized fmn causes a reduction in strikes and of the proportion of
labor disputes that lead to strikes. 47 Giving employees stock changes
their incentives and brings their interests closer to those of the
shareholders. This is a more promising path than stakeholder
governance.
When other stakeholders are tossed into the recipe, the conflicts
become glaring and overwhelming.48 Employees want the highest
compensation and job security and the easiest working conditions.
Customers want the best products at the lowest prices. Creditors want
the highest assurance of prompt payment of their claims. Suppliers
want the largest orders at the highest prices. Environmentalists want
to minimize pollution. These preferences make irreconcilable
demands on corporate resources. 49

ZEITSCHRJFT FUR BETRJEBSWIRTSCHAIT 453 (1998) (study in Germany); Mark J. Roe, German
Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. BUR. L. 199, 199-200 (1999)
(arguing that co determination has created problems for corporate boards and German securities
markets); Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, Class Slniggle Inside the Finn: A Study of German
Codete1mination (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7945, 2000), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=245742 (finding that the higher the labor representation on corporate
boards, the lower the company's market to book value). But see Kent Greenfield, Remarks at
the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium: Corporations and Their Co=unities 15
(Jan. 25, 2008) (transcript on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review) (hereinafter
Greenfield, Symposium Remarks] (praising co-determination in Europe).
To the extent that co-determination has succeeded in Germany, it may be a result
of conditions unique to Germany. See Alberto Chilosi & Mirella Damiani, Stakeholders
vs.
Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Mar. 20, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=975293. Professor Greenfield cites an unpublished study showing that
countries with strong co-determination have lower income inequality, higher labor productivity,
fewer days lost to strikes, and lower unemployment. Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note I, at
25. Apart from the possibility that this study is just wrong and that the studies reaching contrary
conclusions are right, there is a question of which way causation runs. Perhaps nations with
higher productivity and lower unemployment are more willing to sacrifice growth by instituting
co-determination.
45 See Faleye et al., supra note 40, at 490 (study in Canada).
46 See Peter Cramton et al., ESOP Fables: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership
Plans on Labor Disputes I (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 347, 2008), available
at http:/lssrn.corn!abstract= 1266717.
4 7 See id. at 2, 20; see also Ginglinger et al., supra note 43, at 25-26 (describing a French
study finding that exercise of statutory right of employees to elect directors when they own over
3 percent of the employer's stock did not impair firm value of financial policy).
48 See generally Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 7, at 354.
49 Thus, for example, "lender control may generate suboptimal results due to the
suboptimal investment incentives that parties not fully covered by explicit contracts may have."
Sergio A. Muro, Lender Control Liability Functional Examination: The Firm and Heuristics 3
(2008) (Cornell Law School J.S.D./Doctoral Student Paper), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
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Professor Greenfield proposes that "the concerns of all the finn's
investors should be brought into the governance of the firm. " 50 He
says the details for implementing this proposal "will be difficult,
though not impossible." 51 Difficult! Now there's an understatement.
Apart from its employees, what are the constituencies of General
Electric that would be entitled to representation on its board? And
how will they be chosen? How will "communities in which the
company employs a significant percentage of the workforce . . .
propose a representative for the board"?52 Will that be done by the
mayor of the city where the company has its headquarters? Its largest
facility? Or will the governor choose a director for every company
incorporated in the state? If consumers, the environment, and others
are to be represented, the difficulties of selection get even tougher.
The problem here is not Professor Greenfield's imagination; the
problem of implementation is inherent in stakeholder theory. Even
Ralph Nader concedes: "It seems impossible to design a general
'interest group' formula which will assure that all affected
constituencies of large industrial corporations will be represented and
that all constituencies will be given appropriate weight. " 53 Indeed, he
tacitly acknowledges this difficulty-no sooner does he take up the
issue than he drops it for good.
Unfortunately, the idea of board representation for stakeholders
resurfaces regularly, reviving the problem of its implementation. This
is not a minor quibble. Appointment of directors for political rather
than economic reasons could cause serious damage, even if ·the
political appointees were only a minority of the board. They would at
least obstruct the efficient operation of boards, and would
appropriately be treated as spies and enemies by investor
representatives on the board. Professor Greenfield claims that boards
would benefit from greater viewpoint diversity. 54 Again, practice
shows that he is right-but in a way that shows that he is
fundamentally wrong. Boards do strive for diversity-by including
representatives from various industries and professions. They also try
to understand stakeholders by seeking advice from expert consultants.

cornell/dsp/papers/2.
50 Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1044.
5 r-Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, l HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 87, 115
(2005).
52 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 980.
53 RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124 (1976); see also ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 688-90 (1986) (stating that social responsibility proposals
are vague about goals and inconsistent about means).
54 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note I, at 26-28.
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However, they rarely include stakeholder representatives as directors.
Obviously, they do not perceive that doing so would be beneficial.
If we mandate stakeholder governance, would we include or
exempt non-public companies? Or would inclusion depend on the size
of the company? If so, how measured? Assuming that there is some
kind of cutoff line below which companies are exempt, that becomes
a powerful incentive for companies to stay below that line.
For non-exempt companies, how would the antagonistic
stakeholder interests be balanced? A best-case scenario is that
corporate boards would embody America's pluralism as elected
legislatures now do, with all the group conflicts that occur in
politics. 55 Given that, however, why not just hand control of industry
to government? It surely is more efficient to have industrial policy
decided by a few democratic, pluralistic bodies than by many.
Centralization would also permit the coordination of industrial policy,
rather than the chaos that would result from having myriad firms
following inconsistent policies. If this were done by the federal
government, the coordination would be nationwide.
In other words, why not have socialism? The answer is that nearly
everyone now agrees that socialism has proved unworkable; even
most of the Left has lost faith in it. 56 Nonetheless, it is less
problematic than having innumerable corporate boards, each
supposedly democratic and pursuing the social good, but working at
cross-purposes. For all its flaws, democracy (in its bourgeois, liberal
form) is the best form of government. Societies are more
economically prosperous, however, if industry is organized to
maximize economic efficiency, not pluralist participation.
Although firm owners cannot generally abuse constituents with
whom they contract,57 shareholder governance does not invariably
produce a fair exchange. Employers may, for example, take
advantage of employees who have made commitments to the frrm. 58
55 See JEAN TIROLE, FINANCIAL CRISES, LIQUIDITY, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 118 (2002) ("Conflicts of interest among the board generate endless

haggling, vote-trading and log-rolling. They also focus managerial attention on the delicate
search for compromises that are acceptable to everyone; managers thereby lose a clear sense of
mission and become political virtuosos.").
56 To his credit, Professor Greenfield does not suggest social ownership of the means of
production. Indeed, after tossing out the idea of board representation for stakeholders other than
employees, he then completely drops it. Thus my comments here are not intended as "name
calling" or to conjure a "socialist menace," see Greenfield; Stakeholder Governance, supra note
3, at 1052-53, but to point out that representation of these constituencies seems inevitably to
lead to government participation in corporate control, and that no one has figured out how to
make this work well.
57 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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We must, however, avoid the Nirvana fallacy of concluding that
because shareholder control is not flawless, it is unacceptable. 59 The
proper question is whether it works better than any other option.
Stakeholder theorists have not come close to designing a superior
alternative.
II. Is SHAREHOLDER WELFARE (I.E., MAxiMuM SHARE PRICE) THE
PROPER GOAL?

Professor Greenfield proposes changing the rules for the election
and fiduciary duties of corporate directors. The corporate lodestar, he
says, should not be maximization of shareholder wealth but
"abundance for all. " 60 Professor Glynn proposes changing the
"internal affairs" doctrine and urges some specific changes for
corporate law. I will respond first to Professor Greenfield's proposals
and then to Professor Glynn's specific changes. I discuss changing the
"internal affairs" doctrine below.
A. Changing the Selection and Duties of Corporate Directors

Professor Greenfield says that "corporations, and therefore
corporate law, are created in the interest of society as a whole."61 I
agree. The questions, then, are how corporations can best serve
society, and what corporate governance structure best enables
corporations to accomplish this goal? Some commentators support
stakeholder governance even though they concede, at least tacitly,
that stakeholder governance would not enhance shareholder welfare.
In effect, this is an attack on capitalism since shareholders are the
suppliers of capital. It is not surprising that most people instinctively
dislike capitalism. Who of us relishes competition from others? And
the central phenomenon ofcapitalism, made famous by Adam Smith,
that pursuit of private gain through competition with and exploitation
of others results in public benefit, is completely counterintuitive.
So are many of its corollaries. For example, it seems logical that
industrial policy should strive directly to maximize the quantity
and quality of employment, yet we know from experience that this is
59 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON.
1, 1 (1969) ("The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the
relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'imperfect' institutional arrangement.
This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which
the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who
adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and if
discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient.").
60 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 1, at 2.
61 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 962.
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self-defeating. To an enterprise an employee is a cost, and costs are to
be reduced or eliminated whenever possible in order to increase gain.
Professor Greenfield asked why the cost of capital is not also a
cost to be minimized. 62 Indeed it is. And once capital is committed to
an enterprise, returns on that capital can be reduced or even
eliminated, thereby reducing the cost of capital to zero. In other
words, capital can be expropriated. However, any polity that
expropriates capital or reduces returns on capital below the
international market level will get no more of it. That is what we
observe in Communist and other regimes that overtly expropriate
capital, and also in nations where property rights are so weak that
investors fear that they will not get a market rate of return, including
countries where shareholder rights are weak or the rule of law is
lacking.
At the least, feeble shareholder rights raise risks to investors. Since
most investors are risk-averse, 63 countries with weak investor
protections will actually have to pay a higher cost of capital. Like
Professor Greenfield, I want to minimize the cost of capital in
America, so we should both favor the strongest possible shareholder
rights, which will reassure investors that America is the safest place
to put their money.
I also share the desire of Professor Glynn and Professor Greenfield
for the best possible treatment of American workers. Here, again,
though, a direct approach would be counterproductive. Just as you do
not lower someone's fever by putting her into a refrigerator, you do
not benefit workers by mandating the highest wages, the best
workplace conditions, and the greatest job security. In fact, job
creation has been much better in economies that make it easier for
employers to dismiss employees either for poor performance or
because innovation has rendered the employee superfluous. 64 Thus

62 See Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 39 (stating as part of his
rebuttal that "finn shareholders are costs, too," and, regarding the cost of capital, "it is not
actually clear why one stakeholder, the shareholders, are to win and the other stakeholders are to
lose Within the corporate forum").
6 3 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 31, at 117 ("[M)ost people are risk averse most of the
time.").
64 See Arthur Foulkes, Ludwig von Mises Institute, ln Defense of Employment-at-Will
(May 23, 2005), http://mises.org/story/1821 (stating that employers react to laws limiting
dismissal of employees by switching to temporary employees who are not subject to the
limitations); id ('"[C]ountries with more flexible labor markets enjoy greater benefits from
technological change, have better records in job creation, and experience faster growing
economies."' (quoting a 1994 OECD Report)); Pietro Garibaldi & Paolo Mauro, Job Creation:
Why Some Countries Do Better, in ECONOMIC ISSUES 12 (lnt'l Monetary Fund, Econ.
Issues Series No. 20, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/externals/pubs/ft/issues/
issues20/index.htm ("[E]xtensive employment protection appears to dampen job creation .... ").
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shareholder control is probably the best arrangement for each finn's
employees. 65
Nonetheless, given that the benefits of capitalism are
counterintuitive, it is not surprising that capitalism is never secure in a
democracy. Everyone wants to be insulated from some effects of the
market, and people do not notice any of its benefits that accrue only
to others. Professor Greenfield touts a desire for stability, but
capitalism, as Joseph Schumpeter said, is creative destruction. 66
Striving for stability can easily produce stagnation.
Professor Greenfield seems to fmd the shareholder-wealthmaximization principle a priori unacceptable: "The argument, as I
understand it, is that corporate managers best advance society's
interests by ignoring them .... Not even Adam Smith's invisible hand
was assumed to be so powerful that people should be prohibited from
taking the interests of others, or society in general, into account." 67
This is not a proper understanding of shareholder primacy. First,
corporate law does allow directors some discretion to act for the
benefit of non-shareholders. A board may, for instance, make
reasonable charitable gifts that are not intended to maximize profits. 68
Second, far from being "prohibited from taking the interests of others
65 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 31, at 420-21 (stating that "pursuit of shareholder wealth
maximization often redounds to the benefit of non-shareholder constituencies" and that in a
hypothetical bargain among all corporate stakeholders "we would expect a bargain to be struck
in which shareholder wealth maximization is the chosen norm"). Professor Greenfield cites
"something on Wall Street called the 7 percent rule" which says

the best way to bolster your stock price in the short term is to announce layoffs or
wage cuts because Wall Street loves it when you cut employment, because it shows
that you are tough on cutting costs, and it shows that you are dedicated to a focus on
profit rather than long-term human resource development.
Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 11-12. As his source for this "rule"
Professor Greenfield cites a New Yorke~: article. See Greenfield, Reclaiming; supra note l, at 12
(citing James Surowiecki, It's the Workforce, Stupid!, NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2007, at 32). I
had never previously heard of this "rule," and I doubt that it is taken seriously by intelligent
investors and executives. In some cases it makes sense for a company to make layoffs and wage
cuts. Professor Greenfield cites some cases where share prices have jumped following
announcements of layoffs. Id. at 13 nn.48-51. But this hardly means that any company can raise
its share price by laying off workers. Growing companies typically increase employment and
compensation. Moreover, there is little support for the theory of short-termism implied in this
"rule." See supra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
66 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942)
(Chapter VII, entitled "The Process of Creative Destruction").
67 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 966.
68 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 31, at 435 (stating that charitable gifts are generally
allowed "so long as the amount in question is reasonable and some plausible corporate purpose
may be asserted"); id. at 436 ("Virtually all states have adopted statutes specifically granting
corporations the power to make charitable donations .... "). See generally Thomas W. Joo,
Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 351, 361 (2004) ("No courts
actually require management to maximize shareholder wealth .... ").
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... into account," directors are required to do so-they are enjoined
to pursue the shareholders' interests, not their own.
It is true that in corporate governance shareholder wealth is
elevated over the public interest, but this is common for fiduciaries or
anyone who controls other people's money. I doubt that Professor
Greenfield would be pleased if his bank or investment company
donated his life's savings to a charity, however deserving the cause
might be. Their job is to maximize his wealth, not the public interest.
That is not to say that none of Professor Greenfield's wealth should
go to charities, but only that it is he who should make that decision.
Likewise, corporate directors are fiduciaries for the shareholders'
money; the shareholders, not the directors, should decide how to use
it in the public interest.
Stakeholder theorists also object that corporations can "profit by
extracting economic rents from society by externalizing social
costs." 69 This is an exaggeration. Corporate directors are required to
obey the law. If a corporation breaks the law and injures others, it can
incur a variety of civil and criminal liabilities. If society believes that
the negative externalities from some activity are still excessive, it can
simply change the law to discourage or outlaw the activity.
In this regard corporations are just like individuals and
non-corporate organizations that are deterred by legal sanctions from
imposing costs on others. Professor Greenfield says individuals are
different because we "have a conscience, and we are subject to certain
reputational norms that corporations are not." 7 First, the high level of
criminal and other anti-social activity in our society shows that many
individuals have an underdeveloped conscience. Second, although the
corporation itself is a fictitious person and cannot have a conscience,
corporate shareholders, directors and officers do have consciences.
Professor Greenfield suggests that private corporations are better
than public in this respect because the owners of private corporations
can act on their consciences while directors of public companies are
required (by economic and social forces if not by law)· to ignore their
consciences in order to maximize share price. This is at best
misleading. Public corporations can and do make charitable gifts, for
example. Further, once their shareholders have reaped the
(maximized) gains from their stock, they are free to apply these gains
to altruistic ends. They often do so; the philanthropy of Bill Gates and
Warren Buffett are two prominent current examples. It also surprises
me that Professor Greenfield proclaims the moral superiority of

°

69
?o

Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1055.
Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 8.
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private corporations. 71 Progressives tend to prefer public companies
because their greater public visibility makes them more sensitive
about the social consequences of their acts.
In other words, corporations (and especially public corporations)
are affected by their reputations. That is why they not only tout their
products, but also cultivate images as good citizens through charitable
gifts and other public-spirited activities. If these forces are inadequate
to the purpose for corporations, so that stakeholders should be
inserted into their internal governance, is the same true for other
organizations, like private universities, cultural institutions, and labor
unions?
Reliance on external forces (i.e., the law) to deter anti-social
corporate behavior is likely to produce a better result than simply
instructing directors to act in the public interest. Even in liberal
democracies the record of economic regulation is spotty, but unless
we espouse total anarchy, some regulation is necessary to give effect
to the public interest. The question, then, is whether this regulation
should be implemented through legislatures or through corporate
boards chosen in an as yet undetermined manner. The latter is
hazardous. To allow corporate boards to deploy the vast assets of
corporations in whatever way they consider socially optimal is to vest
them with huge political power. That the power is fragmented among
myriad firms lessens the dangers, but it also makes it more difficult
for citizens to monitor what is being done (supposedly in their
interest) and to hold those in power (i.e., the corporate directors)
accountable than it is when this power is wielded by a legislature.
Professor Greenfield understands the reasons for shareholder
primacy to be that: "(1) advancing shareholder wealth trickles down
and advances social wealth; (2) requiring managers to look after
responsibilities other than advancing shareholder interests actually
releases them from any real responsibility; and (3) it is more efficient
to regulate corporations from the outside than from the inside." 72
Here, again, he sets up a straw man. These are not the best arguments
for shareholder primacy.
The "trickle down" metaphor is upside down. It suggests that
wealth already exists and that, after shareholders grab it, some trickles
71 Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 10 ("If it had been a publicly held
company, I strongly doubt that [paying workers during the period it took to rebuild the factory
after a fire] would have been possible for him [the privately held corporation's CEO] to do
because doing the right thing often costs money in the short term and sometimes in the long
term, and that's impossible for a company that has to make sure that the next quarter targets are
satisfied.").
72 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 966-67 (footnotes omitted).
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from them down to others. That's not how business works. Wealth is
not pre-existing; it is created by enterprise. Shareholders realize
profits after operations, not before. A firm first hires employees and
purchases supplies and services in order to produce the products that
it then sells. 73 That is why capital is needed at the outset. Stakeholders
get paid before profits are generated, even if profits are never
generated. Failure to generate profit-indeed, the loss of much or all
the equity capital invested-is no chimera; most new businesses lose
money.
Professor Greenfield sees as a corollary of the "trickle-down"
thesis that the interests of shareholders and stakeholders coincide, 74 a
proposition he rejects. His denial is valid but ironic since he himself
argues that stakeholder governance will not harm investors since they
all have the same incentive to "grow the pie."75 The interests of
stakeholders and shareholders overlap to the extent that neither wants
a quick failure. Beyond that, their interests diverge.
Professor Greenfield objects that ownership of capital is so
concentrated that "a rule that says that shareholders win is a rule that
says the very richest among us wins." 76 This is true and regrettable,
but what should we do about it? Again, stakeholders tend to benefit
when corporations prosper, so lowering profits by reducing efficiency
helps no one. Altering corporate governance to lower returns to
shareholders is also dubious because capital is international and can
move abroad. 77
A better approach is to facilitate efficiency and the corollary of
high profits, then mitigate economic inequality by subsidies for those
who need help and by taxes that are progressive (more so, in my
opinion, than we have now). I do not oppose putting "adjustments to
73 Professor Greenfield argues that "shareholder profit could even result from a transfer of
wealth from the company's employees or from society in general to the shareholders." Jd at
967. He gives the example that, "by some accounts, Wal-Mart's employee wages are so low that
its workers must subsist on a range of government assistance programs. In effect, government
programs subsidize the profits ofWal-Mart shareholders." Jd. at 967 n.87 (citation omitted); see
also Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 40.
Obviously Wal-Mart pays its employees something, so they make more money (and, since
they take and keep the jobs, must consider themselves better off) with their jobs than they would
make without them. It is not clear why Professor Greenfield says that government assistance
programs subsidize Wai-Mart rather than the employees. Government assistance programs do
not cause workers to take lower compensation from Wal-Mart; if anything, these programs
enable workers to hold out for higher compensation. Moreover, if there were some benefit to
Wai-Mart, it would extend equally to other employers, including Wa!-Mart's competitors, so
that the ultimate beneficiary would presumably be their customers-i.e., in this case, the general
public.
74 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 967.
1s See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
76 Greenfield, Symposium Remarks, supra note 44, at 11.
7 7 See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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corporate governance law ... on the table." 78 This Symposium shows
that they are on the table, and I accept that. However, in surveying
the buffet of policy choices from which we can choose, I believe that
other dishes are more healthful and tasty, even if they are less
appealing to the eyes of some progressives.
We should also spread the ownership of capital. To some extent
that is already occurring; pension funds are growing rapidly. Capital
accumulation is still far too unequal, though, and is not changing fast
enough to reach equity soon. We should enact policies (like tax
breaks for saving by lower- and middle-income citizens) to hasten
change.
Professor Greenfield claims that "a decisionmaking calculus that
takes shareholder interests as its goal will sometimes result in
decisions that are overly risky from the standpoint of society as a
whole." 79 At least in theory this might be true. Because of limited
liability and investment diversification, rational shareholders of a firm
with substantial debt might prefer risky projects with negative net
present value to safe projects with positive value. The reason for this
is that if a risky project fails, creditors bear much of the loss, but if it
succeeds the shareholders reap most of the profits. 80
However, it should be remembered that corporations create
positive as well as negative externalities. Again, when shareholders
prosper through high profits, employees, customers, suppliers, and
communities in which the firm operates generally also benefit. Thus
the goal of corporate governance should be not to minimize the
negative externalities from corporate activities, but to maximize their
net positive externalities-i.e., the difference between the positive
and negative externalities.
Stakeholder governance is not the way to achieve this goal. First,
stakeholders contract with the finn and can either contract for limits
on risk or demand compensation for the risk they assume. In practice,
both approaches are used. Major lenders insist on restrictive
covenants that curb the borrowing firm's discretion to increase risk. 81
Lenders also extract higher interest rates from risky borrowers.
The market alone does not entirely solve the problem, though,
because it is difficult for some stakeholders to contract efficiently
Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1061.
Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 967.
80 See RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION§ 3:12, at 31 (1993); RONALD
J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISIT!ONS
244-45 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the conflict between debt and equity).
81 See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
ofBond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
78

79
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with the flffil. It is often hard for employees to identify and price the
hazards (physical and economic) of their jobs. And for some, like
passers-by who might be injured if a plant explodes, it is hard to
contract with the flffil at all, even if they know the risks posed.
Nonetheless, the problem may not be very great. Most companies
are non-public and their shareholders' investments are not fully
diversified, so they are often as risk-averse as the employees. In
practice most public companies are dominated by their executive
officers who, like most rational people, are also risk-averse. 82 Indeed,
it is a little ironic that Professor Greenfield charges that corporate
governance now generates too much risk. Although this is
occasionally true, managers are generally cautious, 83 and excessive
caution may be a bigger problem than excessive risk.
Professor Greenfield says "there is little reason to believe that
society as a whole is risk neutral with regard to corporate
decisions. " 84 "Society" is a diversified investor. 85 It is risk averse
about its entire portfolio. (At least it ought to be. Our nonchalance
about environmental degradation and ~government debt make me
wonder if it is.) However, it should be risk neutral about the conduct
of individual corporations except in rare cases when one flffil's risk to
society cannot be diversified away. Like the diversified investor,
society should seek to maximize the return from each investment,
then use the winners to compensate for the losers.
To the extent that excessive risk-taking remains a problem,
stakeholder governance is certainly not the best solution since it
creates grave problems of its own. 86 Better solutions would include
82 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also supra text following note 5
(referring to CEO autocracy).
83 "[L]ess monitoring by owners makes managers invest less rather than more in order to
enjoy the quiet life." 0yvind B0hren et a!., Corporate Governance and Real Investment
Decisions 3 (Mar. 2, 2007) (unpublished EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891 060 (citing their own empirical findings and Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial
Preferences, Ill J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1047 (2003)); see also Kose John et a!., Corporate
Governance and Risk Taking 1 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979413 ("When ... private benefits are large, insiders may undertake
sub-optimally conservative investment decisions to preserve them. Better investor protection
reduces these private benefits and may therefore induce riskier but value enhancing investment
policy.").
84 Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1058. I agree with Professor
Greenfield that "society as a whole ... is not an absolute profit maximizer. There are other
economic and non-economic 'goods' we value." !d. However, I see little reason to think that
most people do or should consider stakeholder participation in corporate governance an intrinsic
good (like Jove or freedom of religion) that should be promoted even if it is economically
wasteful.
85 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 31, at 116-19 (explaining risk and diversification).
86 See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
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giving employees and customers better access to information about
physical hazards of the firm's facilities and products; direct regulation
of hazardous activities (as by forbidding highly dangerous activities
and requiring insurance for less risky behavior); and perhaps some
broader exceptions to limited liability. 87
In addition to stakeholder governance, Professor Greenfield favors
altering the fiduciary duties of corporate officers to encompass all the
firm's stakeholders. "Courts could simply hold directors and
management to a duty to the firm as a whole, defmed as the collection
of interests imbedded in the firm, rather than a specific subset of it
(the shareholders)." 88 His discussion of how much of a change this
would be, however, is inconsistent. First he says that "some corporate
law scholars . . . believe that this is even the best description of
current corporate law. Indeed, some cases can be read to presume
such a broad reading of fiduciary obligations. In any event, such a
change in doctrine would not represent a huge transformation. " 89
However, he then says "the benefits of this change would be
significant. " 90
How can a change so minor that it may be no change at all
generate significant benefits? As already noted, stockholders striving
to maximize share value have significant incentives to treat
employees decently. 91 Thus it is doubtful that there is any systemic
problem of mistreatment of workers to begin with. Neither Professor
Greenfield nor other stakeholder advocates have offered any firm
evidence that there is a widespread problem.
Professor Greenfield denies the claim that "a broadening of
corporate responsibilities is counterproductive because managers can
use the additional responsibilities to avoid responsibility. If corporate
managers have more than one 'master,' they can play masters off of
one another . . . ." 92 He properly notes that "people routinely have

87 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). Thus it is not true, as Professor Greenfield
alleges, that I "urge[] ... trust in the market ... even if it is inefficient, defective, or slow in
responding" to stakeholder suffering. Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at
1045. I only believe that different legal mechanisms would protect stakeholders better than the
one Professor Greenfield favors.
88 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 976. Along similar lines, it has been
proposed that the fiduciary duty of care be expanded to require boards to consider the interests
of all stakeholders. See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for
Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L REV.
438, 468-81 (2007).
89 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 976 (footnote omitted).
90 !d.
9 1 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
92 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 968 (footnote omitted).
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more than one responsibility, some of them even conflicting, and we
do not throw up our hands." 93 Moreover,
corporate law duties are simply not enforced in a way that
would allow managers to play one duty off the other. Both
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty have been reduced in
recent decades to essentially procedural obligations-to
investigate various alternatives, to look at the various possible
outcomes, to take the time necessary to make a good
decision, to make decisions untainted by self-interest. These
obligations would not be weakened if they were owed to
more stakeholders. 94
There is much truth in this claim. Corporate law is now remarkably
indulgent of self-serving conduct by managers, especially regarding
executive compensation. 95 It is hard to imagine that creating a new
duty to stakeholders could make matters any worse. However,
investors themselves have started to rein in selfish executives, and
this trend is likely to continue. 96 Moreover, there are means by which
managers could be made truly accountable to shareholders. 97 Creating
a new duty to stakeholders would cut off the possibility of curbing
CEO autocracy. 98
What is most disturbing, then, about Professor Greenfield's
position is that, by supporting a position that would affect little or no
change, he tacitly bolsters the status quo. The status quo is CEO
domination, resulting in grossly excessive executive compensation,
costly entrenchment of incumbents, wasteful empire building, and

I d. at 969.
I d. at 969 (footnote omitted).
95 Professor Greenfield acknowledges this. "[T]he business judgment rule gives
executives large discretion in managing the firm. Semor management have used this flexibility
to increase their compensation to unprecedented levels." Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note I,
at 14.
96 See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note I 7, at 1264-69.
97 See il!fra note I 45 and accompanying text.
98 In the Umted Kingdom a new law, Compailles Act § I 72 (2006), requires corporate
boards to "promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole" and to
consider several interests, including the effects of corporate actions on stakeholders, the
commuillty and the environment. See Jenillfer Hill, The Shifting Balance of Power Between
Shareholders and the Board: News Corp's Exodus to Delaware and Other Antipodean Tales 25
(Vanderbilt Umv. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=I086477 (discussing this law). It is too soon to know what effects this
law will have and, in any case, it may be hard to separate those effects from many other
influences, including some laws that give shareholders more protections in U.K. than in
Delaware compailles. See, e.g., id. at 39 (discussing the greater protection of U.K. shareholders
in takeovers).
93

94
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stock manipulation. 99 Professor Greenfield's proposal would shift a
few corporate crumbs to non-shareholder constituencies while leaving
this system essentially intact. We should strive for better.
Professor Greenfield, though, claims that "adding to the number of
people who benefit from managers' fiduciary duties will make it more
difficult for managers to get away with violating those duties. More
corporate stakeholders will have an interest in monitoring and
remedying managerial rnisconduct." 100 It is a mystery, though, how
consumers or suppliers would curb management excesses. Without
effective enforcement mechanisms, executives could simply flout
stakeholders as they have been (and to a large extent still are) flouting
investors. 101
Finally, Professor Greenfield confronts the argument that "it is
more efficient to regulate corporations from the 'outside' than from
the 'inside. "' 102 He does not dismiss this claim . lightly. He
acknowledges that "[e]ven law professors do not believe that
regulation is a good in and of itself. Regulation is a tool to address
public policy ends, and the questions of what problems demand a
public policy response and how best to mold that response should
always be asked." 103 He says that the "'external' versus 'internal'
dichotomy is too simple" because external regulations, like tax law,
"often have as a goal the adjustment of behavior within the firm." 104
That observation is certainly true, but it does not demonstrate that
stakeholder governance would improve corporate behavior. For
reasons already discussed, stakeholder advocates have failed to make
this case.
B. Professor Glynn 's Proposals for Specific Changes in Corporate
Law

In addition to recommending abandonment of the "internal affairs"
doctrine, Professor Glynn proposes some specific changes in
corporate law. First, he proposes that we expand "corporate disclosure
or information sharing requirements to protect nonshareholder

99 See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 17, at 1240-49; George W. Dent, Jr.,
Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L. 39, 42-48 (2005)
[hereinafter Dent, Corporate Governance].
1oo Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 968.
101 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 601, 610 (2006) (stating that instructing directors to serve multiple constituencies would
produce mixed and possibly unstable signals, thus undermining their monitoring role).
10 2 Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 970.
103 !d. at 973.
104 !d. at 971.
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stakeholder groups and other interests." 105 Disclosure requirements
seem so mild that it is easy to accept them. They do not compel or
forbid any underlying behavior; they merely require telling others
what you are doing. We tend to assume that people should not object
to disclosure unless they are doing something wrong.
However, disclosure is not costless. Much of the information
Professor Glynn mentions is not currently produced by most
corporations, so there would be substantial costs just in fmding or
creating (as for forecasts) the requisite information. Even where
information already exists, it will often be costly to compile it, as with
audits of energy use, to meet regulatory specifications. Distributing
the information as required will add further costs. Finally, there will
be the costs of litigation and other disputes over whether the
disclosure requirements have been met. How likely is it that these
requirements will satisfy any reasonable cost-benefit analysis?
Outsiders seeking corporate information have no reason to care about
this because the corporation bears virtually all the costs.
Even if we ignore the monetary costs of disclosure, will all
disclosures be beneficial? In general, the more public information the
better, but there are exceptions. Professor Glynn mentions some areas
where he prefers more disclosure. Are there some issues on which he
and other progressives would not? For example, universities now
generally resist requests for disclosure about how much preference
they grant favored racial minorities in admissions and faculty hiring.
Do progressives demand disclosures about racial preferences from
either universities or corporations? What of corporate information
about production of implements used in abortions?
State lawmakers would choose what corporate disclosures to
require. The process would become politicized. In a pluralist,
representative democracy like ours, special interest groups-small,
tight-knit, committed minorities-often prevail over a disorganized,
apathetic majority. That could happen already, but two factors
I05Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1067, 1091 (2008)
[hereinafter Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception]. He proposes
disclosure requirements on a vast array of subjects that would make firms more
transparent and would give others the information they need to play a greater role in
addressing what firms do, forecasts regarding economic activity, audits regarding
energy use, discussions about downstream strategies with regard to physical plant,
anticipated personnel changes and the like.
Timothy P. Glynn, Remarks at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium:
Corporations and Their Communities 27 (Jan. 25, 2008) (transcript on file with the Case
Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter Glynn, Symposium Remarks]. These requirements
"would also apply to private firms." Id. at 28 .

........-----------
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discourage it. First, if a state imposes burdensome, economically
inefficient rules on its corporations, they can simply reincorporate
elsewhere. Professor Glynn, however, would largely remove that
escape hatch. Second, we now have a general policy at both the state
and federal levels of requiring disclosure only for investment
purposes (i.e., of financially material information). Again, however,
Professor Glynn would change that. Once legislatures start
requiring disclosure for other purposes, the door will be open for
every well-connected interest group to compel the disclosures it
seeks-regardless of overall costs and benefits.
Professor Glynn's second proposed change is "deputization." He
would provide "various corporate actors with the tools or incentives
to monitor firm activity, prevent or correct illegal conduct, or
otherwise protect stakeholder interests. " 106 Again, would the benefits
of this measure exceed its costs? The Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX")
was intended in part to do this by imposing stricter requirements on
corporate auditors, lawyers, and executives. Many (perhaps most)
commentators have concluded that the costs of SOX exceed its
benefits. 107
This requirement, too, would become politicized as special interest
groups sought to require monitors for illegal conduct, no matter how
minor, or for conduct they deem "harmful," even if it is not illegal.
Progressives should recall various government hunts for subversive or
un-American activities and then ask themselves whether widespread
deputization of corporate snoops would necessarily be wise. Again,
would they welcome extension of this proposal to non-corporate
organizations, like universities and labor unions?
Professor Glynn's third proposal is to "impose vicarious liability
on high-ranking corporate officers for the firm's tort or tort-like
statutory violations." 108 Unlike his first two ideas, which are mixed
bags, this one is unambiguously bad. Corporate officers (or anyone
else) are already subject to personal liability for participating in a tort
Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1092.
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Daniel A. Cohen et a!.,
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Contracts and Managerial
Risk-Taking 4 (New York Univ., Working Paper No. 2451/27546, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l280709 (finding that SOX was associated with a decline in research
and development and capital expenditures); Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404
Compliance on Audit Fees, Earnings Quality and Stock Prices (Nov. 26, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=983772.
108 Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1092.
106
10 7
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or statutory violation. Vicarious liability is liability imposed without
any participation, without fault. 109 Liability without fault is unusual in
our jurisprudence. It is premised largely on the superior ability of one
person (the "controlling person") to insure against, or to spread the
liability for, the torts of another person who is unlikely to be able to
respond in damages for his own torts. 110 Thus a corporation is
generally liable for torts committed by its employees within the scope
of employment. 111
What is accomplished by imposing liability on an individual
corporate officer who is without fault? She is not better able than the
corporation to insure against or to spread the liability. Undoubtedly
most firms would indemnify and insure their executives against this
liability, so the main effect would be to add pointless complication to
insurance policies and to add parties and complication to tort
litigation.
To the extent that liability was not just shifted back to the firm by
private arrangement-i.e., to the extent that Professor Glynn's
proposal actually threatened corporate executives with personal
liability-it would make them unduly cautious. Executives of most
large public companies own only an infinitesimal fraction of their
company's stock, and would therefore shun any activity that posed
any perceptible threat of personal liability.
Once more, would Professor Glynn (or other progressives) favor
this proposal for non-corporate executives, like university presidents,
mayors, governors, presidents, and other "high-ranking ... officers"?
If it makes sense to hold corporate executives liable for torts "within
the firm," why not hold the president of the United States liable for
torts committed by national park rangers? And if we are going to
impose broader liability without fault, why stop with "high-ranking"
officers? Why not impose liability on all corporate agents, down to
the lowest employees? Employees on a given assembly line or other
small unit are probably better able to influence their colleagues than is
the CEO of a mega-corporation who is hundreds of miles away.
Professor Glynn's fourth idea is to "impose an independent,
generalized duty on the board of directors to establish and maintain
reasonable monitoring and compliance systems to prevent and correct
109 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 118 (3d ed. 200 I)
("The liability thus imposed is a strict liability.").
110 See id at 118-19 ("[T]he liability is frequently justified on the ground that the master
may spread the risks attendant upon his doing business through insurance." (citing United States
v. Rornitti, 363 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1966))).
Ill See id at 117-18 ("Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
vicariously liable for the negligent or tortious act of its employees acting within the scope of
employment.").
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unlawful or tortious conduct." 112 This is a good idea. Indeed, it would
be desirable to expand generally the duty of care of corporate
directors and officers. (Given that their duty of care is now virtually
non-existent, it might be more appropriate to say "create a duty of
care.") We would then ask what should reasonably be expected of
business executives-in keeping with the objective of maximizing
shareholder wealth.
Our goal would not be to compensate injured persons (as is the
primary purpose of vicarious liability), but to foster responsibility in
officers. We could, therefore, talk about limiting the amount of
liability, but also limiting or forbidding insurance, so that the liability
would not just be shunted onto an insurance company, leaving
· responsibility unaffected. And it would make sense to extend this
liability to officers of non-corporate organizations.
Professor Glynn's fifth proposal is for "the creation of consultation
or participation requirements that would give stakeholders a voice in
firm decision making processes." 113 Such requirements could include
"mandatory consultation with works councils or community
representatives on decisions or planning that materially affect the
relevant stakeholder groups." 114 In commenting on Professor
Greenfield's proposals I have already indicated why this is unwise. 115
Likewise, Professor Glynn's last proposal-to "impose on board
members duties to consider other interests besides shareholders in
fulfilling obligations to enhance the wealth or success of the
fmn" 116-tracks the proposals by Professor Greenfield on which I
have already commented.
lll. DEMOCRACY AND BARGAINING POWER

Professor Glynn and other stakeholder theorists suggest that
stakeholder representation in corporate governance is mandated by
democratic principles. 117 Stakeholder advocates are clearly right that
Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1093.
Jd.
114Jd.
115 See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text
116 Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1093.
117 I d. at 1100 ("Basic democratic principles suggest that those primarily affected by
corporate activity ought to have a voice in how corporations behave.").
11 2

113

[W]e have to consider who ought to be involved in making democratic decisions.
And the situation we have now is the worst of all possible worlds where we have a
jurisdiction, which ... has enormous influence on the most important economic
actors in our society, and it is not democratically accountable to any of these other
stakeholders.
Glynn, Symposium Remarks, supra note 105, at 42.
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stakeholders are affected, often profoundly so, by what corporations
do. It does not follow, however, that they have to have a direct voice
in corporate control. Even in democratic societies, most institutions
outside of government are not democratic. Fans at a baseball game do
not get to vote on whether a runner is safe or out; the decision is made
by an unelected, autocratic umpire. I do not know of anyone who
wants to change that. Even as to government activities, not all
affected persons get to vote. We are all affected by the actions of the
governments of nations, states, and localities of which we are not
citizens, yet we do not get to vote for those governments.
Again, it seems anomalous that stakeholder advocates do not
propose the same medicine for non-corporate institutions, like labor
unions. The same considerations seem to apply there-actions by a
union (e.g., to strike) affect many non-members, including the
employer's stockholders, its employees who are not members of the
union, and its customers and suppliers. (The ripple effects may be
even greater for the acts of public employee unions.) One can argue
that "[n]o constituency would have an incentive to hurt the [union] in
order to gain a larger piece of the pie," as Professor Greenfield has
said of stakeholder participation in corporate governance. 118 After all,
the ability of a union to exert pressure (often, to halt operations) by
striking shows that it is a crucial part of the operation, and other
constituents do not want to destroy a crucial part of the operation.
Further, unions can impair firm efficiency because, to a much
greater degree than shareholders, they do not bear all the costs they
generate-i.e., they create externalities. The costs of a strike to its
members may also be mitigated by unemployment benefits paid for
by taxpayers. Unions may be infected with short-termism because
much of the damage they can inflict will be delayed until after many
incumbent members have retired; they will be borne, inter alia, by
future employees who are not now represented in the union.
The flaws in this argument are obvious, and they apply equally to
stakeholder participation in corporate governance. Although the
interests of union members and other constituencies overlap to some
extent, they also diverge in many ways. Other constituents may not
want to get rid of union members, but they probably do not agree
about what "piece of the pie" they deserve. If they did agree, why is
there a strike? The economic incentives of unions may not be perfect
because of externalities, but it is most unlikely that adding other
constituencies to union governance would improve efficiency.

liB

Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 982.
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The lack of a direct voice does not render stakeholders helpless
before corporate power. As is often the case, an alternative to voice is
the right to exit. 119 Employees can quit their jobs and customers can
take their business to other suppliers if they are dissatisfied. It is
understandable that employees, especially, often feel that this right is
inadequate. Many employees do make commitments of human capital
to their employer that reduce their value to other employers in the
labor market-i.e., reduce their ability to exit if they are treated
unfairly by their employer. 120 Many employees also have personal
commitments, like family ties to their community, that limit their
ability to seek a job elsewhere. The employer may take advantage of
these circumstances in a way that is arguably unfair.
However, it does not follow that corporations generally enjoy a
bargaining advantage over employees, much less customers. Even the
largest company employs only a tiny fraction of the total workforce,
and most American workers in the private sector are employed by
smaller companies that have little or no market power. In general,
companies have strong incentives to treat employees and customers
fairly in order to maximize their long-term profits. 121
A comparison with unions is again instructive. Only a union's
members vote for its officers, but that does not mean that the interests
of other constituencies are flouted. Ultimately, a union must reach a
mutually acceptable agreement with the employer. Like any party in
contract negotiations, a union that is too aggressive will damage
itself. A labor union must also consider its reputation. If it alienates
the public, it can forfeit the sympathy and incur the hostility of the
public and lose its economic support. It can also suffer political and
legislative damage.
IV. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: INvESTORS WITH NO VOICE

A thought experiment: If the right of exit alone does not
adequately protect employees and customers, would stakeholder
advocates be willing to give that right to shareholders in exchange for
their (theoretical) control of corporate governance? Stakeholders

li9The concepts of exit and voice were developed by Albert Hirschman. See ALBERT 0.
HIRsCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970).
12o See Allen Kaufman et a!., A Team Production Model of Corporate Governance
Revisited 13 (Dep't of Strategic Mgrnt. & Pub. Policy, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Bus. &
Pub. Mgrnt, Working Paper 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410080 (noting
that since "each member's skills remain valuable only within the context of the team (and the
firm and industry), individuals cannot threaten to quit and join another effort").
12 1 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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could choose the entire board but, like employees and customers,
shareholders would have the right to "quit" at any time. That is, each
shareholder would have a "put'' allowing her to recover the capital
she invested in the corporation.
What contractual arrangements would develop under this regime?
Actual practice is instructive. Many investors do provide capital
without demanding a voice in governance, but they typically demand
senior securities-either debt securities or preferred stock that
promise a more or less fixed return. This is necessary because those
who do exercise control have no motive to give voiceless investors
anything unless they are contractually required to do so. 122 When does
a company ever pay bondholders more than the stipulated principal
and interest?
But these arrangements exist in businesses for profit only if they
are controlled (at least in theory) by investors. A board controlled by
stakeholders would have no motive to pay dividends on common
stock (if there were any), or even to generate any profit. This is why
non-profit organizations often issue debt securities (i.e., borrow
money), but do not issue stock, common or preferred. Likewise, firms
controlled by stakeholders could not issue securities with the features
we associate with stock.
Puts do exist in some businesses for profit, but again actual
practice does not confirm but refutes the economic rationality of
stakeholder theory. Sometimes venture capitalists acquire stock with a
put. 123 However, these venture capitalists also typically contract for a
voice in control through representation on the board, and contractual
limits on compensation to and self-dealing by the officers, who also
own substantial common stock. In other words, they make sure that
the officers who share control with them have primarily an equity
interest, not just a stakeholder interest.
Further, the put is typically fictitious in that it is not expected that
the company would actually repurchase the venture capitalist's stock
out of corporate funds. Rather, the officers must keep the venture
capitalist happy so that it does not exercise the put; or attract another
121 Sometimes dividends on preferred stock are mandated if the company meets certain
measures of profits. See BOOTH, supra note 80, § 2:14, at 41 ("Dividend rights may be made
contingent on the company's earning enough in the prior period to pay them."). Even if
preferred stock dividends are not mandated, dividends on co=on stock are typically forbidden
unless the preferred stock dividends have been paid. See id. § 2:03, at 10 ("[P]referred stock is
preferred precisely because its dividends must be paid before any distribution can be made to
the co=on stockholders."). Thus a board controlled by co=on stockholders has a strong
motive not to cheat the preferreds.
123 See I MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC 0FFERJNG
NEGOTIATION 348 (1991) (form of mandatory redemption).
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outside investor (by credible promises of attractive returns) to fmance
the repurchase and take the place of the venture capitalist exercising
the put; or default on the put and surrender control to the venture
capitalist. 124 In other words, there is no such thing as a stockholder
who has the same right to "exit" that all employees and customers
enJoy.
In some industries (like hospitals), non-profit and for-profit entities
compete. Even here, though, the governance of non-profit entities
does not embody stakeholder theory. Most non-profit organizations
are controlled by self-perpetuating boards of trustees that do not even
vaguely approximate stakeholder theory. 125 No law bars stakeholders
from forming non-profit entities and obtaining financing in any way
they can to compete with for-profit firms in any industry. That we
observe such non-profit entities only in a few industries demonstrates
that only the shareholder model is efficient in other industries. And
the fact that even non-profit entities eschew the stakeholder model
shows that it is not efficient anywhere.
Ironically, the current practice that most resembles the stakeholder
model is the large, CEO-dominated public company. Dominant CEOs
wield their power to their own benefit at the expense of
shareholders. 126 Stakeholder governance might enable other
constituencies to join in the abuse of shareholders. However, CEO
domination is now under siege. Because of the abuse of investors in
public companies, more companies are being taken private. In
companies that remain public, institutional investors are becoming
more assertive. 127 Because of growing international competition for
capital, these trends are likely to continue and may even accelerate.
Mistreatment of investors is likely to wane. If stakeholder governance
were instituted, this investor rebellion would undoubtedly spread.
In sum, economic theory and real-world practice indicate that the
stakeholder model is not feasible.

124 See George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1048--49 (1992) (describing use of puts to force a change in favor of the
holder).
125 See MICHAEL J. WORTH, NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 64
(2009) ("Most charitable nonprofits have self-perpetuating boards."); see also MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND
REGULATION 159 (2004).
126 See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 17, at 1240--49 (describing CEO
domination and its costs).
127 See id. at 1264-69.
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V. THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
Professor Glynn proposes an end to the "internal affairs doctrine"
under which the internal affairs (or governance) of a corporation are
subject to the law of the state of incorporation. 128 As with Professor
Greenfield, I share many of Professor Glynn's premises, and I cannot
see that this change would be a disaster. However, I suspect that its
net benefits, if any, would be trivial and that it would do little or
nothing for stakeholders.
It certainly is anomalous that corporate internal affairs are
governed by a state with which a corporation has no contact except
the filing of a charter and the payment of franchise fees. The idea that
the freedom of corporations to incorporate in any state has led to a
race to the top, with states competing to offer the most efficient
corporation laws, has been refuted. 129 To the extent that there is such
a competition, it is probably competition to benefit managers, not
shareholders or stakeholders. 130
However, abandoning the internal affairs doctrine would not lead
to dramatic improvement or, perhaps, any benefit at all. There would
at least be a messy transition period as courts struggled to choose the
criteria for determining with which state a corporation has its primary
contacts. Which state would that be for a company with such
scattered operations as General Electric? To resolve conflicting
claims, standards would have to be laid down by Congress or the
United States Supreme Court.
Congress or the federal courts would also have to police state
governance under the dormant Commerce Clause to ensure that states
did not abuse their jurisdiction to favor local economic activity at the
expense of other states or to tamper with the law of other states. 131
12BGlynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1071, 1083-84; see
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW§ 1.2.1, at 35-39 (2000) (explaining the internal
affairs doctrine). Professor Glynn does not propose a single alternative choice of law rule. In
some cases regulation of a company might be limited to the state where it has its "primary
operational or equity investor presence," but in other cases each of the various operations of an
interstate company might be regulated by the state in which that operation is located. Glynn,
Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1086.
129 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom!l'op, 23 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 381 (2005) (questioning whether there is a race to either the top or the bottom);
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004)
(finding that incorporation in Delaware is not generally associated with higher firm value).
llo See Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. lNSTITUTJONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 134 (2006).
131 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 8.1, at 319-34
(7th ed. 2004) (describing the "dormant" commerce clause power).

1140

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4

These limits would shackle any attempt to help stakeholders. The
"primary contact" state could not, for example, interfere with a
domestic corporation's shifting operations out of the state or regulate
employment by the corporation outside the state. The state could
regulate employment conditions within the state (subject to federal
law), but states already have that power.
The state of incorporation could dictate corporate governance
rules. It could, for example, require a corporation to include employee
representatives and appointees of the governor on its board of
directors. Like state taxation, though, a state could not get far out of
line with other states without injuring itself. 132 If a state imposed
inefficient rules, new and foreign corporations would hesitate to put
or move their "primary contacts" there. Domestic corporations
hampered by inefficient governance would grow more slowly, shrink
or fail, or move their "primary contacts" elsewhere. State competition
for jobs has already led states to pander to corporations with tax
breaks and subsidies. Changing from the "internal affairs" doctrine to
a "primary contacts" regime would reduce corporate mobility a little,
but would not fundamentally alter the economic forces inducing
interstate competition.
It is also doubtful that the "primary contacts" state of incorporation
would be more solicitous of investor interests than is Delaware, the
now-dominant state of incorporation for public companies. 133 The
states have already widely embraced antitakeover laws that favor
managers and (maybe) employees at the expense of shareholders. 134
m The practical restrictions on state regulatory discretion would probably be even greater
than they are for taxation. States have wide flexibility in choosing what business activity to tax
or exempt from taxation. By contrast, rules of incorporation would presumably be more general.
A state can, for example, grant a tax abatement for a specific corporate project. Presumably it
would not do so with corporate governance laws.
133 Delaware is chosen by 95 percent of firms that incorporate outside their home state.
Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices ofIPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (2002).
134 See John Pound, On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure:
A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 656,
668-69 (1992) (study finding that companies that opted out of Pennsylvania's extreme
antitakeover law were more highly valued in the market than those that did not). Employees also
tend to like antitakeover laws because they fear that a raider will reduce wages or fire workers,
but most acquirers do not do that. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
ANNuAL REPORT ON MASS LAYOFFS IN 1988, at 2 (1989) (finding that fewer than 5 percent of
major layoffs resulted from changes in firm ownership). The largest study to date of going
private transactions recently found that they are followed by employment reductions of about 1
percent. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Study Says Private Equity Isn't Big Job Killer, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2008, at C6. One recent study finds that "private-equity firms are net job creators."
David Haarmeyer, Private Equity: Capitalism's Misunderstood Entrepreneurs and Catalysts for
Value Creation, 13 INDEP. REV. 245, 278 (2008); see also Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and
Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 315, 317-25
(1993) (concluding that takeovers do not harm stakeholders much, if at all); Roberta Romano,
A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 133-43
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This is not surprising. Officers and employees of public companies
are likely both to be more numerous in the "primary contacts" state
than shareholders, who are scattered across the nation, and to care
more about a "hostile" takeover of the company than the
shareholders, whose investments are generally diversified and who
therefore do not care much about the fate of a single company. If a
"primary contacts" rule did injure public investors, one of its principal
consequences would be to accelerate the trend toward going private.
In sum, it is likely that dumping the "internal affairs" doctrine in
favor of a "primary contacts" rule would do little for stakeholders and
might do some (albeit probably slight) damage to investors.

VI. FEDERALIZING CORPORATE LAW
Progressives periodically urge that incorporation, at least of large
public companies, be taken away from the states and taken over by
the federal government. Professor Greenfield recently revived that
argument, 135 and Professor Glynn alludes to it in this SymposiumY 6 I
have acknowledged the problems of the current regime dominated by
Delaware, 137 but it does not follow that fc;~deralization would be better.
Congress now routinely makes decisions based on the political
interests of Congressmen-such as wasteful home district pork
projects used to attract votes and provide favors to wealthy interests
that attract campaign contributions.
Nonetheless, markets are not perfect; some regulation is necessary
and desirable. The federal securities law, though flawed in many
ways, is on the whole beneficial, so federalization should not be
categorically rejected. Rather, we should be skeptical and entertain a
pretty strong presumption against government intervention;
proponents of regulation should bear a heavy burden of proof.
I do not accuse Professor Glynn and Professor Greenfield of being
un-American, but I want to persuade them (and the reader) that
corporate governance is not just an issue of distribution among
domestic interest groups, but is rather a matter of national well being.

(1992) (same).
13 5 Kent Greenfield, It's Time to Federalize Corporate Charters: Delaware and Other
States Aren't Tough Enough, July 26, 2002, available at http:/llaw.case.edu/lectures/files/20072008/20080 125_Greenfield-TOMPAINE_ com.pdf.
B 6 See Glynn, Towards a Stakeholder Conception, supra note 105, at 1104 ("[T]o the
extent regulatory overreaching or interstate conflict becomes a problem that the states and rmns
cannot resolve themselves, federalization of corporate law . . . ought to be the primary
remedy.").
m See supra notes 5-6, 18-21 and 99 and accompanying text.
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After World War II the United States was unique as a safe place for
capital investment. Its dominance shrank a bit with the economic
revival of Europe and Japan, but until recently competition for capital
was limited.
Professor Greenfield is complacent about this: "Given the power
and stability of U.S. markets, there are very few places likely to offer
[investors] a better risk/return ratio." 138 That is now ceasing to be true.
Capital is international and becoming as fluid as quicksilver. China,
India, Brazil, and other countries have adopted capitalist ways and
become more attractive to investors. Europe is increasingly
embracing shareholder value as the proper norm for corporate
governance. 139 One recent study using measures developed by the
World Bank found the United States to be below average in investor
protection. 140 Recently Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation shifted
its incorporation from Australia to Delaware in an effort to weaken
shareholder rights. 141 In 2006 the Paulson Committee Report declared
that"[ o]verall, shareholders of U.S. companies have fewer rights in a
number of important areas than do their foreign competitors" and that
lack of shareholder rights was affecting the level of investment in
. 142
US
.. compames.
If investors in American public companies continue to suffer the
abuse and contempt of CEOs that are now common, investors will go
elsewhere. To some extent they already have. The proliferation of
private equity stems in large part from the benefits of avoiding the
138 Greenfield, Reclaiming, supra note 1, at 32. Professor Greenfield has also written that
"there is little reason to worry that capital will abandon ship if the U.S. adopts a similar model"
to Europe's "robust system of stakeholder protection." Kent Greenfield, Corporate Ethics in a
Devilish System, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 427, 434 (2008). Given the slow economic and
employment growth in western Europe in recent years, this is not a good model to emulate. See
supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
139 See Greenfield, Saving the World, supra note 23, at 949 ("[A]s globalization intensifies,
the narrow shareholder-executive focus of United States corporate law is increasingly exported .
. . ."); Lans Bovenburg & Coen Teulings, Rhineland Exit? 16 (Tinbergen Inst. Discussion Paper
No. 2007-10!13, Dec. 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1082707. It has been
predicted that all countries with market economies will converge at a single model of corporate
governance. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistory for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001). There is debate about how far and how fast this trend will go. See
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J.
Roe eds., 2004).
140 Simeon Djankov et a!., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430
(2008); see also Bovenburg & Teulings, supra note 139, at 12-14 (study fmding that Denmark
adheres more closely to the norm of shareholder value in corporate governance than does the
United States).
141 See Hill, supra note 98, at 28-66 (discussing the battle between Murdoch and
institutional shareholders and the various shareholder rights at stake).
142!NTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 93
(rev'd
version
Nov.
30,
2006),
available
at
http://www.caprnktsreg.org/
pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
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agency costs of the separation of ownership and control characteristic
of public companies. But private equity is not a complete solution to
the problem. Investors who need some liquidity, for example, will
invest elsewhere. Indeed, they are already doing so. American
investors are rapidly going abroad, and foreign investors are staying
away.
If this continues, American firms will have to pay more for capital
than foreign competitors. 143 Our economy will suffer. 144 And workers
and communities will suffer most. If progressives care about these
constituencies, this is the problem on which they will focus.
There are many proposals to strengthen shareholder protection.
Many of them would be beneficial but trivial. That includes the
proposals tabled by the SEC to allow shareholder nominees for the
board. 145 I have a proposal that I think would produce real change:
The nominees for the board on a company's proxy statement should
not be chosen by the incumbent board, which is usually dominated by
the CEO. Rather, they should be chosen by a committee ofthe ten to
twenty largest shareholders. This would ensure the selection of
directors who are truly committed to maximizing share value. 146
And maximizing share value, I submit, should be a goal of
progressives. Employees tend to be paid better, have better job
security, and have better opportunities for promotion in firms that are
profitable and growing than in firms that are stagnant or declining.
More important, workers generally fare better in a growing economy;
there is no better program for workers than a tight job market.
I realize that this is not a complete solution to the problems of
workers, communities, the environment, etc. Even a vibrant economy
does not prevent unreasonable inequality, cost externalities, and the
14 3 See Mark J. Garmaise & Jun Lin, Conuption, Finn Governance, and the Cost of Capital
(Feb. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=644017 (finding
that fmns in countries with weak shareholder rights face a higher cost of capital).
144 See Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection, Optima/Incentives, and Economic Growth,
119 Q.J. BeaN. 1131, 1131-35 (2004) (fmding a positive correlation between investor
protection and economic growth).
145 Indeed, the SEC amended rule 14a-8(i)(8) to overturn the decision in American
Federation ofState, County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc., 462
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006), which required the company to include in its proxy statement a
shareholder proposal to amend the company's bylaws to permit inclusion of shareholder
nominees in the company's future proxy statements in certain circumstances. Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007).
146 See Dent, Corporate Governance, supra note 99, at 67-75. It is not at all true that I
believe that "[t]he government must step in ... in order to protect shareholders from the
vagaries of the market." Greenfield, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1045. I propose
only that the default rule for choosing the company's official nominees for the board be changed
to vest that power in those who have the greatest incentive to maximize wealth-i.e., the
shareholders.
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dislocations that stem from the "creative destruction" that is
capitalism. However, those problems should be addressed by means
other than corporate governance. Precisely what should be done is an
interesting question, but that is the subject for another symposium.
CONCLUSION

I do not delude myself; nothing I say will drive a stake through the
heart of stakeholder theory and finally put an end to this folly. I hope,
however, I can persuade realists that, however appealing the specter
of stakeholder participation in corporate governance, it is a mirage. It
is also a distraction; it diverts attention from more promising
initiatives. Shareholder primacy-real shareholder primacy, not the
counterfeit version we have now-is the corporate governance system
that holds the greatest promise for both investors and employees. 147 It
will not achieve a desirable level of equality, but policies other than
stakeholder governance are better suited for that purpose.

147

See Hansmann & Kraakrnan, supra note 139, at 441:

All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized and
operated to serve the interest of society as a whole, and that the interests of
shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests of
any other members of society. The point is simply that now, as a consequence of
both logic and experience, there is a convergence on a consensus that the best means
to this end ... is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder
interests ... .

